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successful operation have been removed from the body."8 It would perhaps be reasonable in some instances to provide for another surgeon to
close the incision, but in the absence of such a provision the only reasonable understanding as to the undertaking of the surgeon is that performing the operation includes closing the incision and the duty to remove all
foreign substances from the wound is an integral part of the operation.9
This duty can now be avoided and a hospital rule requiring attending
nurses to tally the sponges used and removed will not relieve the surgeon
of liability for a sponge negligently left in the wound.1O The fact that
the nurses used in the operation are the nurses of the hospital and that
the hospital is not owned or controlled by the surgeon do not relieve the
surgeon. As to the master and servant relationship when the servant is
used by another, the Appellate Court of Indiana has said: "The true test
in such cases is to ascertain who directed the movement of the person
committing the injury. When one person lends a servant to another for a
particular employment, the servant for anything done in that particular
employment must be dealt with as the servant of the man to whom he is
lent, although he remains the general servant of the person who lent
him."1 1 Under this test the nurses in the instant case were the servants
of the operating surgeon.12
It appears that the courts have taken three distinct views as to the
so-called "sponge cases." First, that such cases are no different from the
ordinary malpractice case and expert testimony alone is admissible in evidence to prove the surgeon's negligence.1 3 Sedond, that a case of a sponge
being left in the incision is an apparent exception to the ordinary malpractice case and no expert testimony is required to warrant the jury in
finding the surgeon negligent.14 And third, that where a surgeon leaves a
sponge in a patient's body, "there being no possibility of any good purpose
resulting therefrom," that act constitutes negligence as a matter of law.15
For this class of border line case the Indiana Supreme Court has adopted
the second and middle view.
J. S. H.
PLEADINGs-CoNsTRUCTION-PLAINTIFF MUST ALEE COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTe--This was an action of tort for fraud of an alleged agent in respect to duty arising out of contract. Plaintiff alleged that he was engaged
in real estate business in Mississippi and a non-resident of Indiana; that
sAkridge v. Noble (1902), 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78.
Palmer v. Humiston (1913), 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N. E. 283; Harris v. Fan
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Brand (1915), 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461; Davis v. Herr (1913), 239 Pa. 551,
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"McCormick va. Jones (1929), 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181.

RECENT CASE NOTES
prior to August 16, 1921, certain Mississippi and Louisiana real estate was
placed in his hands to buy, sell, or exchange for other real estate which he,
plaintiff, might find to be desirable; that plaintiff "engaged the services of
defendant Myers"; thereafter, by negotiations "a deal was consummated"
whereby one Hiatt was to transfer certain Indiana real estate to plaintiff
in exchange for the Mississippi and Louisiana real estate; that defendant
Myers breached his employment, and carried on negotiations direct; that
plaintiff would have made $100,000, but was deprived of that profit by the
wrongful act of the defendant, Held, on demurrer, that the allegation that
the plaintiff was a non-resident was that he was a "foreign person" within
the meaning of the statute forbidding "foreign persons" to negotiate exchange of Indiana real estate unless duly licensed; that a contract made
without first complying with the law, by being duly licensed, was void;
that damages for fraud cannot be based on void contracts.' The complaint
was to be construed against the plaintiff.
The common law rule was that pleadings were to be construed against
the pleader. 2 This rule was in line with the general rule of construction
applicable to written instruments. The pleader chose the words he used,
and if ambiguous he should not gain an advantage; but should be bound
by the strict meaning of the words selected. However, a more liberal rule
is to be preferred, one that will give effect to all the material allegations
whenever reasonably possible.3 This common law rule has been changed by
statute 4 which says: "In the construction of a pleading, for purpose of
determining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a
view to substantial justice between the parties." Pleadings are to be liberally construed as to form, but this does not dispense with the necessity
of properly pleading facts which constitute the cause of action.5 The test
to be applied to a complaint on ruling upon demurrer is, "For purpose of
testing the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action, a demurrer admits the truth of all facts well pleaded, but it does not admit conclusions of law, nor all conclusions which may be drawn from such facts
by the pleader."O It has often been stated that the demurrer admits the
truth of all facts well pleaded and all reasonable inferences. Thus, the
Code adopts a rule of liberal construction of the pleadings, but this has not
always been applied. The courts have had a tendency to follow the common
law rules of construction and often in cases of ambiguity have construed
the pleadings against the pleader.7 The correct rule seems to be that pleadLMeyers v. Henderson, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 30, 1932, 181 N. E. 729.
Burrows v. Yount (1843), 6 Blackford 458.
Ulint, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Beckett (1906), 167 Ind. 491, 79 N. E. 505.
'Burns' Ann. St. 1926, See. 403.
5Belt Railroad Co. v. Mann (1886), 107 Ind. 89, 7 N. E. 893.
'Morten v. City of Aurora, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 27, 1932, 182 N. E.
2
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7State ex rel. Mackenzie v. Casteel (1886), 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. 214; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Smock (1892), 133 Ind. 411, 33 X. E. 168; Plessinger v.
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App. 269, 95 N. E. 602; Wabash R. Co. v. McNown (1913), 53 Ind. App. 116, 100
N. B. 383.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ings are construed against the pleader only when that is necessary to do
substantial justice between the parties, but that at all other times a liberal
construction should be given the pleadings.8
Assuming that the question of the pleadings was properly decided there
is still a question present under our statute requiring non-resident brokers
to procure a license. There is a presumption of legality and it is a matter
of defense upon the party desiring to take advantage of the illegality of a
contract to plead and prove it. This, the almost universal rule, is generally
followed in Indiana as announced in Hogston -v. BeUl,9 which says: "It
being presumed that the contract sued on as set forth in the complaint -was
for a valuable consideration and without fraud, the burden is on defendants to impeach it and show by preponderance of evidence that it was
fraudulent or contrary to public policy." According to this line of reasoning, the majority view on the question of the proof of a broker's license is
that the proof of license in the first instance is not necessary, a license
being presumed.10 In an action for his commission by a broker, who is
unlicensed, it is a matter of affirmative defense that must be set up by
answer the same as unfaithfulness or dual employment, which are waived
if not pleaded." This idea of making the lack of license a defense to be
pleaded and proven by the one wishing to take advantage of it, fits in with
the general rules of pleading; but it is not the rule in Indiana.
Many states have permitted a recovery of a broker's commission, by an
unlicensed broker, where the statute of that state is for the express purpose of raising revenue;1 2 even where the statute or city ordinance provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation by
principal or agent to carry on, conduct or maintain, or follow any occupation or business, * * * without having complied with all the provisions
of this ordinance."1 3 Again, it has been held that a statute requiring a
broker to take out a license is not prohibitory, but merely fixes a penalty,
and that an unlicensed broker is not precluded from recovering his commission. 1 4 These questions do not arise under our Indiana statute15 requiring non-resident brokers to procure a license, because by the nature of
our statute it shows that it is not for the sole purpose of raising revenue
but rather to regulate business for the protection of the residents of the
state.
8Dikesheets 'v. Kaufman (1867), 28 Ind. 251; Stone v'. State (1881), 75 Ind.
235; Polson v. Polson (1895), 140 Ind. 300, 39 N. E. 498; Smith v. Borden (1903),
160 Ind. 223, 66 N. E. 498; Kahle v. Crown Oil Co. (1913), 180 Ind. 131, 100 N. E.
681; Domestic Coal Co. v. DeArmey (1913), 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675, 102 N. E.
99; Midland R. Co. v. Gascho (1893), 7 Ind. App. 407, 34 N. D. 643; Grass v. Ft.
Wayne Trust Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 395, 81 N. B. 514; Heritage v. State (1909),
43 Ind. App. 595, 81 N. E. 114; Lautenschlager v. Walgsmotl (1923), 80 Ind. App.
198, 137 N. E. 781.
0 (1916) 185 Ind. 536, 112 N. E. 883.
1
HMunson v. Fenno (1889), 87 Ill. App. 655.
"Sullivan v. Durante (1910), 83 Kans. 799, 109 Pac. 777.
12Coates v. Locust Point Co. (1905), 102 Md.291, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. p. 895;
Ruckman v. Bergholz (1874), 37 N. T. L. 437; Fairly v. Wappoo Mills (1895), 44
S. Car. 227, 22 S. B 108.
"Hughes v. Snell (1911), 28 Okla. 828, 115 Pac. 1105.
i4 Tooker v. Duckworth (1904), 107 Mo. App. 231, 80 S. W. Rep. 963.
"Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Gec. 9783, 9790.
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The majority view has been that where a statute requires a person or
firm to procure a broker's license, a contract made by a person in such a
business without the procuring of a license is void and no recovery can be
had thereon.1 6 This majority view that a contract is void when the requirements of the statute requiring the license is not met has been followed in Indiana. Indeed, it has been so extended that the contract has
been declared void; even though the statute does not specifically so state,
but places some regulation upon entering or engaging in the business.17
In these cases the complaint was insufficient unless the plaintiff had alleged
the performance of all the requirements of the statute. Thus, it may be
said that in Indiana, where a business, profession or acts have been made
the subject of legislation and penalties have been fixed for failure to comply with the statute, the one who asserts a right based on such business,
profession, or act must affirmatively allege compliance with the statute as
a condition precedent to his right.
C. A. R.
TAxATIoN-INHunrrANcE TAX-INTANGIBLE
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LAW-Included in the estate of deceased, a subject of Great Britain, and
resident of Cuba, not engaged in business in the United States, were bonds
and certificates of stock of foreign governments and corporations, bonds of
domestic corporations and a domestic municipality, and a deposit with a
domestic banking concern. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included
these in the gross estate of deceased subject to Federal estate tax under
the Revenue Act of 1924. The Board of Tax Appeals decided the Act did
not apply to such intangibles,' and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held, first, that
the Act was intended to include such property, and second, that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment did not make the tax invalid be3
cause of lack of jurisdiction; judgment of lower courts reversed.
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court decided in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota4 that
negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by State or municipal governments, some registered, and others negotiable, are rightly regarded as if ordinary choses in action, and a death duty can be placed on
them only by the State of the domicile of the owner. Baldwin v. Missouri5
extended this rule to include bank deposits, Federal coupon bonds and
promissory notes; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission6 extended
24Hirk v.Rich (1910), 156 111..App. 483; Sprager v. Reilly (1907), 34 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 332; Pile v.Carpenter (1907), 118 Tenn. 288, 99 S. W. 360.
1t
Becker v. Perw Trust Co. (1912), Ind. App. 184, 97 N. D. 23; Sandage v.
Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. (1895), 142 Ind. 148, 41 X. E. 380; Horning v.McGill
(1919), 188 Ind. 332, 116 N. E. 303; Wells v.Indianapolis Co. (1928), 88 Ind. App.
231, 161 N. D. 687.
122 3.T. A. 71.
260 Fed. (2nd) 690.
3Burnet, Commis. of Internal Revenue, v. Brooks, March 13, 1933, 53 Sp. Ct.
457.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sp. Ct 98 (1930).
5 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sp. Ct. 436 (1930).
'282 U. S. 1, 51 Sp. Ct. 54 (1931).

